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Abstract 
Community forestry in Nepal is intended to reduce poverty by sustainable 
management of forests. Timber is one of the most high-value forest products, 
especially in the case of Sal (Shorea robusta) forests in the Terai region of Nepal. 
Despite having several advantages, including high value forests on fertile land, 
connection with transportation networks, and being close to regional markets, 
community forests in the Terai region produce little or no timber from their Sal 
forests. This research looks at what is affecting the production of Sal timber from 
community forests. Three aspects of community forest user groups (CFUG) are 
examined using institutional economics, transaction cost economics and micro-
economics. First, the scale of CFUG operations is examined in terms of their ability 
to profitably carry out logging and organise market sales. Second, the capacity of 
CFUGs to carry out logging in terms of internal physical and human resources, and 
property rights is examined. Finally, barriers to vertical integration with the market 
in terms of contracting and cooperation with other CFUGs are investigated. To 
answer these questions, data was collected from 85 CFUGs and interviews were 
carried out with 39 key respondents from CFUGs, government agencies, and private 
firms. The results show that the size of the forest was not an issue for harvesting and 
marketing logs. However, the organisational capacity of CFUGs was found to be 
weak because of a lack of financial resources, limited property rights over timber, 
control over decisions by the District Forest Office, policy constraints, and 
corruption. In terms of vertical integration, a lack of legal rights to enter into 
contracts, a high degree of uncertainty about policy and property rights, small and 
irregular amounts timber harvest, and the interpretation of CFUG rules by the 
District Forest Office were found to be barriers for the formation of long-term 
contracts between CFUGs and private firms, and of cooperative developments 
between CFUGs.  
Keywords: Community forest user group, institutional economics, transaction cost 
economics, cooperatives, contractual arrangement, Nepal 
 
Introduction 
 
The Community Forest (CF) programme in Nepal is considered to be one of the most 
successful community resource management programmes, particularly in terms of 
social and ecological outcomes (Kanel & Dahal, 2008). However, from an economic 
perspective, community forestry in the Terai, a fertile plain, appears to have failed.  
The Sal forests of the Terai region have a high potential to reduce poverty and in 
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principle, this has been a main objective of CF through sustainable forest 
management.  However, the economic potential of community forestry is largely 
unrealised, despite having many comparative advantages such as high value forests 
with Sal (Shorea robusta) and Khair (Accacia catechu), fertile land, relatively good 
road access, and the existence of local markets (Bampton & Cammaert, 2006; Oli, 
2003). There is concern that high local demand for Sal timber is being fulfilled from 
illegal logging in public forests rather than from community forests (Chakraborty, 
2001; Kanel & Dahal, 2008). Therefore, an analysis of timber production from 
community forests in the Terai region of Nepal is very important.   
 
Historically, management and ownership of forest resources in Nepal has been a 
continuous battle between local people and the state. Before the Forest 
Nationalisation Act 1957, all forests were under either private ownership or 
indigenous management systems, and generally well-managed. The Forest 
Nationalisation Act 1957 brought all forests under government ownership and 
resulted in extensive deforestation and degradation due the loss of property and 
management rights.  In order to reduce the heavy forest destruction caused by the 
Forest Nationalisation Act 1957, the government decided to return management and 
control of forests to local communities.  It did this by introducing the community 
forest policy in 1989 which established the community forest user group system 
(Kanel & Dahal, 2008; MPFS, 1989). The CF programme became one of the most 
prioritised programmes of the state and was further strengthened through legal 
backing of the Forest Act 1993 and the Forest Regulation 1995.  
 
Based on the Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulation 1995, a CFUG is an 
autonomous and perpetual organisation (Acharya, 2005; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; 
Chakraborty, 2001; Grosen, 2000). Grosen (2000) argues that based on these legal 
frameworks, a CFUG is free to produce, process, and trade timber within Nepal. The 
Forest Act 1993, however, bans the export of timber. A CFUG can take the 
management responsibility of any portion of state‟s forest on the condition it 
undertakes sustainable management. According to the legal framework, ownership of 
forest land remains with the state, however, ownership of stocks and flows of timber 
and other products remain with the CFUG.  
 
The district forest office (DFO) represents the state when dealing with CFUGs. The 
DFO has technical advisory as well as monitoring roles with a CFUG to ensure 
sustainable forest management (Mitchell, Bajracharya, & Baral, 2001). In the case of 
forests that remain under state management, the DFO also has policing and judicial 
roles. These additional roles can create problems for CFUGs because although it is 
unclear whether these roles are also applicable to CF, they may be exercised (Grosen, 
2000). Some scholars argue that the DFO has withdrawal power over CFs as well as 
semi-judicial power (Mitchell et al., 2001). 
 
The research issue in this paper is why there is little or no Sal timber being produced 
for the market from CFs in the Terai.  The main reason for studying this issue is that 
CFs in this region have several advantages in terms of producing Sal timber, and thus 
a high potential generating revenue and reducing poverty. This research increases the 
understanding of timber production and organisational or institutional barriers 
affecting CFUGs. This understanding will help CFUGs, government agencies, and 
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market agents such as log buyers, sawmillers, and timber wholesalers to develop the 
Sal timber business, increasing CFUG income, and reducing poverty.   
 
Literature Review 
 
Collective action in common property resources (CPRs), such as fishery, forestry, 
and irrigation, is a new paradigm in sustainable management.  It emerged after the 
seminal paper, “The Tragedy of the Commons” by Garrett Hardin in 1968 (Agrawal, 
2001; Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy, Katon, & Harkes, 2001). It 
was argued that collective action through an institution of local resource users can 
take better care of CPRs when backed by the state and with favourable policies. The 
success of collective action depends on clearly defined property rights over 
resources, financial assistance, and resource governance institutions.  Community 
forestry is a widely used form of collective action, especially in developing countries 
(Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Antinori & Bray, 2005; Birner & Wittmer, 2000; Bray, 
Antinori, & Torres-Rojo, 2006; Kanel & Dahal, 2008; Zhang, 2001).  
 
Several theories have been put forward about what factors are constraining CFs from 
realising economic benefit from their Sal forests in the Terai (Bampton & Cammaert, 
2006; Kanel, 2006; Oli, 2003; Timsina, 2007). The first is that individual forests are 
too small to profitably organise harvest and market sales. For example, the average 
size of a CF is only 75 hectares (Kanel and Dahal, 2008). For organising harvest and 
market sales as a business, economies of scale is very important (Pratten, 1971; 
Timsina, 2007). Sakurai et al. (2004) studied timber production in CFs and private 
forests in Nepal, and found that CFs in the Terai had lower protection costs and 
higher silvicultural costs than other regions. However, the minimum efficient scale of 
timber harvest is not known.   
 
Profitability includes an analysis of factors that affect imput costs, output prices, and 
productivity.  This can be done using partial budget models or estimation of 
production and cost functions (Cubbage, Wojtkowski & Bullard, (1989) Carter & 
Siry, (2003)Siry & Newman, (2001).  For production and cost functions, important 
factors for studying harvesting systems are typically tract size, stand volume, tree 
size, equipment configuration, production rate, or input prices. In the case of 
community forestry, Misra & Kant (2004) found that the conventional factors such as 
forest land size, forest quality, user group size were important for production as well 
as the non-conventional factors such as the heterogeneity, dependence of user group 
on forest products, village leadership, role of women, knowledge of the government 
orders, existence of non-government organisation (NGO), distance to the market and 
time.  
 
Another possible constraining factor may be organisational or institutional problems 
in terms of arranging harvests for external sale. Oli (2003) found that the wood 
products market in Nepal was highly inefficient because of low stumpage value and 
high transaction costs. These were in turn caused by an unsatisfactory government 
regulatory role, a complicated auction process, and policy uncertainty.  The 
transaction cost economics (TCE) considers production not only the process of 
transformation (production function), but also the process of carrying out business 
that includes additional costs, such as the cost of information, and the cost of making 
and enforcing negotiation (Dorward, 2001; North, 1990; Williamson, 1998). These 
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costs depend on the formal rules of property rights of resources and the performance 
of the polity, bureaucracy, and judiciary. Thus, TCE looks at the governance 
structure of markets, whether is is the spot market, contracting, hierarchy, or public 
bureau. Based on TCE, an organisation decides whether to use “buy-it” (spot market) 
or “make-it” (hierarchy) as a business strategy. The contracting/cooperative mode of 
governance structure lies between these two alternatives.  
 
The third possible constraining factor may be institutional barriers to entering into 
contracts, or forming larger cooperatives for logging, processing and market sales of 
timber. Production studies in the case of non-timber forest products has indicated 
some major constraints to market development, such as remoteness, lack of market 
information, small amounts of forest products, and no collaboration between CFUGs 
and market agents (Dhungana & Dahal, 2004; Kayastha, Pradhan, Rasaily, Dangal, 
& Arentz, 2002). It is possible that vertical integration for an individual CFUG might 
be too costly because of small forest size and low timber production. This means that 
vertical coordination with market agents and horizontal coordination among CFUGs 
are potential alternatives.   
 
The organisational capacity of a CFUG depends on factors such as the size and 
quality of the forest resource, the extent of property rights, access to financial 
resources, and support from government organisations (Antinori & Bray, 2005; 
Torres-Rojo, Guevara-Sangines, & Bray, 2005), and corruption (Nair, 2007). These 
factors are dependant directly or indirectly on economic, political, and legal 
environments, technology and attributes of common resources (Dolsak & Ostrom, 
2003).  Cooperative arrangements between small producers can be an effective 
means to increase bargaining power and create business opportunities.  However, a 
number of barriers to forming cooperatives, such as insufficient capital, unskilled 
management, transaction costs of contracts and negotiation, weak contract 
enforcement, weak public infrastructure to support markets, information asymmetry, 
and poorly functioning factor markets (Brennman, 2004; O'Connor, 2003; Staal, 
Delgado, & Nicholson, 1997).  Timsina (2007) reported that the only one CFUG-
Cooperative sawmill of Nepal was on loss because of low human capital of 
management committee and constraints for timber harvesting, processing, transport 
and marketing because of ad hoc interpretation of policy by the DFO.  
 
Antinori & Bray (2005) and Zhang (2001) argue that a community forestry user 
group can be considered as a social firm which fits between a public firm and a 
private firm. The community forestry enterprises of Mexico (Antinori & Bray, 2005; 
Bray et al., 2006) and fishery communities of New Zealand (Yandle & Dewees, 
2003) are examples of social firms carrying out businesses with sustainable 
management of a resource. It is the context of being a social firm that creates a 
particular focus for studying community forestry.  In particular, there is a need to 
understand the impact of CFUG structure and institutions on their ability to operate 
efficiently and profitably.  In this study, these aspects are examined using a 
combination of profitability analysis, transaction cost economics, and instiutional 
economics. 
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Methods  
 
Nepal consists of four main ecological regions – Terai, Siwalik or inner-Terai, Hill, 
and Mountain (Gautam, Shivakoti, & Webb, 2004; Pokharel & Amatya, 2000).  The 
Terai and inner-Terai are fertile plains that range between 70 and 1200 m above sea 
level and extend from east to west. This region occupies roughly 20 percent of the 
geographical area of Nepal, but is home for about 45 percent of the population.  The 
Rupandehi and Udayapur districts were selected from the Terai and inner-Terai 
regions respectively for this study. Both of these districts have relatively extensive 
Sal forests under community forest management, as well as long term support from 
international organisations for the community forestry programme.  
 
General characteristics of the study areas and national data for comparison are given 
in Table 1. The two study districts are different to one another in terms of population, 
forest area, number of CFUG, and CF area.  Population is concentrated in the 
Rupandehi district, whereas forest and CFUGs are concentrated in the Udayapur 
district.  The Rupandehi district has only 23.4 percent of land area in forest, whereas 
Udayapur has 56.8 percent of land area in forest. Out of a total of 274 CFUGs and 
59,800 hectares of forest area under community management in the two study areas, 
only about 20 percent of CFUGs, covering about 14 percent of community forest 
area, are located in the Rupandehi district.  Generally, these districts are good 
representatives of the Terai and inner-Terai regions, and the differences in forest 
endowments and population in the two districts provides scope for extending the 
analysis to wider range of districts. 
 
Table 1: General characteristics of study area. 
Description Unit National 
Total # 
Study district * 
Rupandehi Udayapur 
Area (‟000) Hectare 14,718 136.8 206.3 
Population („000) Number 26,427 708.4 287.7 
Forest area (‟000) Hectare 4,800 32 117.3 
CFUG Number 14,000 56 218 
CF area („000) Hectare 1200 8.2 51.6 
Source: *District Forest Office Rupandehi and Udayapur 2007; # Kanel 2005; CBS Government of 
Nepal 2007. 
 
For the production analysis of timber, cross sectional data for 85 CFs for the year 
2006/07 were collected from mainly secondary sources. These data included forest 
area, amount of annual harvest, logging cost, amount of labour, logging rate, 
transportation cost, and revenue. For the analysis of organisational capacity and 
contracting/cooperative barriers, qualitative data in the form of personal interviews 
were collected from 39 key respondents representing CFUGs, government agencies, 
and private firms. 
  
The characteristics of sample CFUGs are presented in Table 2. The characteristics 
include household number, forest area, forest endowment per household, year of 
operation, annual harvest, and market sale. The snapshot view of characteristics of 
sample CFUGs is given in Table 2. Like the District-level statistics, the 
characteristics of sample CFUGs in Rupandehi are poor in terms of forest resources, 
and those in Udayapur are better off. For example, in Rupandehi the sample CFUGs 
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have large household numbers (mean 1277 households) and small forest areas (mean 
168 ha), resulting in a small forest endowment (mean 0.21 ha per household), similar 
with the district level mean of 0.208 ha per household. In contrast, in Udayapur the 
sample CFUGs have relatively small household numbers (mean 217 households) and 
small forest (mean 268 ha) resulting into a good forest endowment (mean 1.5 ha/ 
household) – similar with the district level mean (1.51 ha per household).  
 
Table 2: Summary of sample CFUGs.  
Characteristics Unit Rupandehi district Udayapur district 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
Household  No. 19 5480 1277 26 848 217 
Forest area ha 1.47 1558 168 4.6 824 268 
Forest endowmt. ha/HH 0.02 0.68 0.21 0.17 4.82 1.5 
Operation Year 2 14 6.5 1 14 5.8 
Annual harvest m3/group 8.2 204 49* 2.3 161 75** 
Market sale m3/group 0 65 4 12 157 38 
Source: District Forest Office and Department of Forest 2008. 
Note: * timber from dead/fallen trees; ** 25 m3 out of 75 m3 consists of timber from dead/fallen trees 
 
In terms of the number of years CFUGs have been operating („operation‟ in Table 2), 
both districts were similar. The average annual harvest of timber per CFUG was 49 
m3 in Rupandehi and and 75 m3 in Udayapur. The annual harvests in the Rupandehi 
district were made only from dead and fallen trees because of a virtual logging ban 
by the DFO. However, in the Udayapur district, timber was extracted from both 
green and dead trees. This has flow on effects for market sales where the average 
market sales of roundwood per CFUG was only 4 m3 in Rupandehi and 38 m3 in 
Udayapur. 
 
The production-related quantitative information were analysed using OLS. As the 
focus of this study was on the regular harvest of timber from green trees the 
production related data only from them were included in the statistical analysis. The 
qualitative information from interview of respondents were analysed using NVivo 
software and simple frequency count to extract themes of organisational capacity of 
CFUG and institutional barriers for contracting/cooperatives. 
 
Results 
 
Timber production analysis 
 
The first objective of this study was to estimate the economies of scale of logging. 
The initial plan was to estimate Cobb-Douglas production and cost functions, 
however this proved to be impossible because logging was done through contracting 
and it was not possible to get useful production and cost data.  In addition, as was 
discussed earlier, the data for this part of the analysis comes only from the Udayapur 
district because in Rupandehi district all harvested timber was from dead trees.  
 
The logging in CFUGs was found to be labour intensive and using basic, local tools. 
On average, only 65% of the annual allowable cut (AAC) was harvested. One reason 
for this was that CFUGs were primarily interested in Sal timber and while they 
harvested that portion of the AAC, they might not harvest the AAC of other species. 
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Another reason for not harvesting full AAC could be an institutional. The minimum 
size of market sales was found 12 cubic meters. In contrast, for internal sale any 
small amount was found harvested. 
 
The contract rate for logging was examined to determine whether the size of a forest 
had any correlation with contractd logging cost. There was found to be no link 
between scale and logging cost (Figure 1). The main reason for this appears to be 
that the piece rate for logging was determined on the basis of only logging difficulty 
related to topography and road access. The logging cost was lowest in flat areas 
(Plain) and increased with slope (Hill 1 and Hill 2) (Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Effect of size on logging cost by topography of community forests 
 
Despite the differences in logging cost between different terrain types, from the 
survey timber production was found to be profitable irrespective of topography. The 
reasons for this are that in the Nepalese context the management costs of market 
sales are relatively small compared to the revenue from Sal timber, and logging costs 
are borne by the log buyer instead of the CFUG.  
 
Despite the profitability of timber production from CFs not all CFUGs harvested 
timber for market sales. Furthermore, there was variability in net revenue of CFUGs 
despite of having similar topography and logging costs. There might be some issues 
related to organisational capacity and associated transaction costs. These issues are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Although a production or cost function could not be estimated, an analysis of the 
factors determining the level of annual harvest (AH) was examined using OLS. A 
number of factors were tested, including contract logging cost, annual allowable cut 
of Sal, forest area, road accessibility as dummy variable, and forest location as 
dummy variable.  The significant determining factors were found to be annual 
allowable cut of Sal (AACsal) and forest area (FA). The determinants of annual 
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harvest of CFs similar with previous studies of Siry & Carter (2003), Mishra and 
Kant (2004), and Siry & Newman (2001). 
 
 AHi =  5.43105 + 0.68992 AACsali   + 0.04503 FAi 
 t0.05  (1.3188)    (11.6644)                (2.8820) 
 r
2
 = 0.778 d. f. = 60 
 
Organisational capacity of CFUGs 
 
The second focus of this study was whether the organisational capacity of CFUGs 
created a problem in organising logging or integrating vertically with the market. The 
organisational capacity of CFUGs were examined by asking a range of open-ended 
questions about internal resources such as human and financial capital, property 
rights over timber, relationships with external parties such as the DFO, private firms 
(log buyers and sawmillers) and NGOs, and policy constraints. The key themes about 
organisational capacity which emerged from this analysis are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Organisational capacity themes 
 
 
Note: N is number of respondents 
  
The organisational capacity of CFUGs was found to be weak because of a lack of 
human and financial capital, weak property rights over timber, the controlling role of 
the DFO, selling constraints as interpretation of CF policy for internal use of forest 
products, and corruption. These findings were similar with the studies of Antinori & 
Bray (2005), Behera & Engel (2006), Bray et al. (2006), Dolsak & Ostrom (2003), 
and Mishra & Kant (2004). 
 
Contracting and Cooperative barriers 
 
The third focus of this study was whether there are barriers to contracting and 
formation of cooperatives that would prevent or limit vertical integration with 
market. The contacting and cooperative barriers were examined by asking a range of 
open-ended questions about external barriers, policy constraints, different types of 
uncertainties, enforcement mechanisms. The results are shown in Figure 3. 
Respondents identified a number of barriers for both contracting between a CFUG 
and private firms, and for cooperative arrangements between CFUGs. There were 
also many constraints to making a formal contract between two parties. These 
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constraints include a lack of policy regarding contracts, legal restrictions against the 
ability to contract, uncertainty over behaviour of private firms, timber market, quality 
and measurement of timber, lack of enforceability, small quantity and irregular 
production of timber, and the controlling role of the DFO. A majority of respondents 
believed that the contracting form of vertical integration could be beneficial to 
CFUGs as well as to private firms. However, it appears that formal contracting 
between a CFUG and a private firm for vertical integration of timber production and 
marketing is a difficult task. In Udayapur district, some CFUGs were found to be 
entering into informal contracts with private firms for logging and sales.  
 
Figure 3: Contracting barriers themes 
 
 
Note: N is number of respondents 
 
Figure 4 shows the results of a similar analysis of the potential and constraints to 
cooperative arrangements between CFUGs. Almost all of the 29 respondents 
interviewed believed that cooperative arrangements could benefit CFUGs. In fact, 
some CFUGs have already initiated preliminary forms of cooperation. However, for 
a formal cooperative arrangement, there are some constraining factors. The 
constraints were found to be an unclear policy, the DFO‟s unsupportive role, lack of 
government leadership, corruption, and variability in the quantity of production. 
Respondents generally considered a cooperatively operated sawmill when asked 
about possible cooperatives. 
 
Figure 4: Cooperative barriers themes  
 
 
Note: N is number of respondents 
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Compared to contracting, cooperative arrangements between CFUGs seem to be less 
constrained. Initially, CFUG cooperatives, even informal, could give bargaining 
power while selling logs to private firms. At later time this could be further 
developed for sawmilling, value added processing, and selling finished products like 
furniture.  These latter types of production must be registered formally at the District 
Cottage and Small Industry Office. It became clear that the cooperative arrangements 
between CFUGs could be done by putting detail scheme of cooperatives formation in 
the work plan of CFUGs. However, to make this happen, it appeared to be a 
challenging task to convince the DFO.     
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate why little or no Sal timber was being 
supplied to the market from community forests of the Terai and Inner-Terai regions 
of Nepal. The three specific objectives of this study were to investigate whether the 
size of an individual community forest created problems in the efficiency of timber 
production, to examine whether the organisational capacity of a CFUG was a 
problem for organising logging and market sales, and to determine whether there 
were barriers to contracting between a CFUG and market agents, or to cooperative 
arrangements among CFUGs for logging, processing and market sales. 
 
The results show that terrain and road access were the key factors in determining 
contract logging costs, and that economies of scale did not have any influence due to 
the low level of capital investment in logging and log transportation.  The level of 
annual harvest of a CFUG was found to be correlated only to the annual allowable 
cut of Sal and the area of forest.  The organisational capacity of CFUGs to manage 
timber harvests and market sales was also found to be weak. The organisational 
capacity in terms of internal resources such as human capital and financial capital, 
property rights of timber, the role of the DFO, variations in the interpretation of 
policy, and corruption were found to be the key problems.  In terms of the ability to 
undertake vertical integration through contracts or cooperative arrangements, there 
are a number of institutional and other barriers. A lack of legal rights to enter into 
contracts, a high degree of uncertainty about policy and property rights, and the 
interpretation of CFUG rules by the DFO were found to be the key institutional 
barriers.  The small and irregular amounts timber harvested were also found to be a 
barrier to the formation of long-term contracts between CFUGs and private firms, 
and of cooperative arrangements betweem CFUGs. The institutional barriers to 
contracting were found to be stronger compared to the development of cooperative 
arrangements.   
 
The study shows that the organisational capacity of CFUGs could be increased by 
developing mechanisms to provide financial assistance to prepare for and undertake 
logging, ensuring clear property rights over timber, and reducing the control of the 
DFO.  In addition, policy constraints or confusion regarding timber processing and 
market sales need to be removed. CFUGs need to be allowed to establish contractual 
arrangements with sawmillers and wholesalers, and supported in the development of 
cooperative arrangements. Lastly, the recurrent them of curbing or removing the 
potential for corruption needs to be addressed. 
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